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BAR BRIEFS
Law, University of Illinois; who will speak on "The Evolution of
the Lawyer."
NORTH DAKOTA ATTORNEYS WITH ARMED FORCES
At page fifteen of the Licensed Attorneys List for 1944 there
appears the names and home addresses of seventy-eight members
of the North Dakota Bar who are with the Armed Forces. This
is nearly twenty per cent of the total membership of our .association.
OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Helena E. Cunningham, Admx. of the estate of William Burton Cunningham, Pltf., vs. G. N. Ry. Company, a corporation, Deft.
That where the party against whom verdict has been rendered makes
timely motion in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding a verdict
6r for a new trial, and it appears from the record that the evidence does not
sustain the verdict and that the moving party was entitled to a verdict,
that there is no reasonable probability that the defects in the proofs may be
remedied upon another trial and that on the record as a whole the moving party is entitled to verdict and judgment as a matter of law, it is error
for the trial court to deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict and order a new trial. Laws 1935, ch. 245.
That in actions under the Federal Employers' iUability Act, 45 USCA,
Sections 51-59, 10A F C A title 45, Sections 51-59, wherever brought, the
rights and obligations of the parties depend upon such Act and applicable
principles of common law as interpreted and applied in the federal courts.
That negligence of the employer is the basis of recovery under the.
Federal Employers' Liability Act. Without negligence there is no right
of action.
That in actions under the Federal Employers' Act, as in other actions
at law for injury to employees, the burden is cast upon the plaintiff to
show negligent conduct on the part of the employer constituting ground
for recovery. The plaintiff must establish a breach of duty on the part of
the defendant and show that such misconduct was in fact the proximate
cause of his injury.
That the question of negligence is generally one of fact for the 'jury,
it becomes a question of law only when the evidence is such that fair-minded men cannot reasonably draw different conclusions as to the facts or the
inferences to be drawn therefrom. But when the state of the evidence Is
such that fair-minded men in the exercise of reason and judgment could
not have reached the conclusion that the person whom the jury by its
verdict found to have been negligent in fact had -been negligent, then the
verdict will be set aside.
That in the instant case it is held; for reasons stated in the opinion,
that there is no evidence from which the inference may reasonably be
drawn that the defendant was negligent, and that the injuries sustained
by plaintiff's intestate were caused by any breach of duty of the defendant;
and that upon the record as a whole the defendant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.
Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Kneeshaw, J.
Action for damages for death of plaintiff's intestate. There was a verdict
for plaintiff. Defendant moved in the alternative for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial. The court denied the motion for
judgment, and ordered a new trial. Both parties appeal. Reversed and
action ordered dismissed. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J.

BAR BRIEFS
In Consolidated Freightways, Inc., Pltf. and Applt., vs. J. S. Lamb,
Highway Commissioner, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That Chapter 194 (sec. 1, subdv (c), S. L. 1941 which provides:
"No vehicle, including the load thereon, shall exceed a length
of thirty-five (35) feet. No combination of vehicles including
the load thereon, shall exceed a length of forty (40) feet. No
more than two units shall be used, in a combination. A tractor
truck and semi-trailer shall be considered as two units. The
provision hereof shall not apply to carriage of equipment of
the Army or the defense forces of the United States
Government of the National Guard of the State of North
Dakota; * * "
is construed, and for reasons stated in the opinion, it is HELD .that the
restrictions upon the size of vehicles that may be used in transporting
persons or property upon the highways of North Dakota as stated in the
first three sentences of such statutory provision, apply to the transportation of all kinds of property upon -the highways of this State, excepting
only "equipment of the Army or the defense forces of the United States
Government or the National Guard of -the State of North Dakota," the
carriage of which is in no manner subject to suoh restrictions.
That a demurrer admits all the allegations in the pleading to which
it is addressed which are issuable, relevant, and' material, and which are
well pleaded; but it does not adrnit conclusions of -the pleader except when
they are supported by, and necessarily result from, the facts stated in the
pleading. A demurrer does not admit mere expressions of opinion, nor
theories or arguments of the pleader as to the effect of the facts; neither
does a demurrer admit allegations which the pleading demurred to itself
contradicts. Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Jansonius,
J. Plaintiff appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to its complaint
and dissolving a temporary injunction. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court
by Christianson, J.
In Lewis Rosenstein,, Pltf. and Applt., vs. Williams County, North
Dakota, Deft. and Respt.
That an owner of land that has been forfeited to the county under tax
deed proceedings, who exercises the right to repurchase such land, makes
payment therefor and receives a deed from the county pursuant to Laws
194-1, ch. 286, cec. 19, becomes vested with all the interest, right and title
held by the co.i-ty in and to such land.
That the deed from the county to such former owner operates to vest
in the grantee in such deed all interest and right of the county in and to
crops then growing on the land as well as title to any unaccrued rent for
use of the land.
Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Gronna, J. Plaintiff appeals from an order sustaining a demurrer to his complaint. REVERSED. Opinion of the court by Christianson, J.

